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1 Introduction 
Close interpersonal ties to the Chief Executive Of-
ficer (CEO) are widely regarded as an important 
asset for other members of a firm’s top management 
team (TMT). Senior executives benefit in a variety of 
ways from strong relationships with the CEO. For 
example, they may glean inside information, protec-
tion, and preferential treatment from such relation-
ships (Adler 2001; Cao, Maruping, and Takeuchi 
2006). In addition, close and long-standing rela-
tionships between the CEO and other senior man-
agers may foster trust and support the formation of 
social capital (Adler and Kwon 2002; Coleman 
1988; Leana and Van Buren 1999). 
At the same time, having strong ties to the CEO may 
also be detrimental to senior managers, in particular 
when the CEO faces severe criticism and is dis-
missed. In these situations an executive, who has a 
close relationship with the CEO, may be seen as the 
CEO’s “partner in crime”, which could raise the 
likelihood that they, too, are dismissed, and hurt 
their chances of being promoted to the vacant CEO 
position. This “dark side” of strong interpersonal 
ties has largely been ignored in the literature to date. 
In this paper, we therefore investigate the career 
implications of interpersonal ties between a TMT 
member and the CEO of a firm from the perspective 
of the TMT member concerned. Our theory devel-
opment suggests that under normal conditions, 
strong ties to the CEO are a source of stability, thus 
raising the likelihood that a manager will remain in 
office (Adler and Kwon 2002; Leana and Van Buren 
1999). When the CEO leaves office for routine rea-
sons (such as voluntary departure or retirement), 
strong interpersonal ties to the CEO enhance the 
possibilities for the manager to make an upward 
move. However, if the CEO faces disciplinary ac-
tions and is fired, a strong relationship with that 
CEO reinforces the negative spillover effects of the 
CEO’s dismissal on the manager’s own career pro-
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spects. Given the generally positive portrayal of 
interpersonal ties to the CEO in the literature so far 
(e.g., Cao, Maruping, and Takeuchi 2006; Collins 
and Clark 2003), we highlight a potential ambiva-
lence in such ties, at least in critical situations such 
as the dismissal of the CEO. 
In our empirical study, we investigate the career 
implications of interpersonal ties to the CEO from 
the perspective of a senior manager in a functional 
role that exists in virtually every large company, 
namely the Chief Financial Officer (CFO). CFOs are 
in a particularly challenging position, in that they 
should maintain a balance between independence 
from the CEO for the sake of greater neutrality and 
objectivity (Daily and Schwenk 1996), and closeness 
to the CEO as the primary strategic partner (Ar-
thaud-Day, Certo, Dalton, and Dalton 2006; Collins, 
Masli, Reitenga, and Sanchez 2009; Tulimieri and 
Banai 2010; Zorn 2004). 
Using a matched-pair design, we analyze data on 77 
CFO-turnover events in large, stock-market-quoted 
companies in Germany between 1999 and 2006 to 
shed light on the ambivalence of strong interper-
sonal ties to the CEO. Using logistic regression 
techniques, we find support for our central expecta-
tions, namely that strong interpersonal ties to a CEO 
help to keep a top manager in office. At the same 
time, when the CEO leaves office, strong ties rein-
force the effect of the CEO’s departure on the likeli-
hood that the TMT member will leave their position, 
too: If the CEO leaves for routine reasons, then a 
strong relationship with that CEO enhances the 
likelihood that the TMT member concerned will 
make an upward career move through internal 
promotion or a move to a better position elsewhere. 
However, if the CEO is dismissed, a strong relation-
ship with that CEO increases the TMT member’s 
risk of also being dismissed. 
Our findings add to managerial succession research 
(Cao, Maruping, and Takeuchi 2006; Fee and Had-
lock 2004; Mian 2001; Shen and Cannella 2002a) 
by highlighting the ambivalence of strong interper-
sonal ties. 
2 Theory and Hypotheses 
2.1 The Importance of Relationships 
between TMT Members and the CEO 
According to social network perspectives, interper-
sonal ties among social actors encourage an attitude 
of goodwill, which facilitates information sharing, 
cooperation, and solidarity in the network con-
cerned (Adler 2001; Granovetter 1973; Nahapiet 
and Ghoshal 1998). The strength of such ties is in-
fluenced through interaction frequency, duration, 
and emotional intensity or closeness of the relation-
ship (Collins and Clark 2003). Strong interpersonal 
ties within TMTs are particularly important in that 
they foster trust and support the formation of social 
capital (Adler and Kwon 2002; Leana and Van Bu-
ren 1999; Lin 2001) which, in turn, may enhance 
the development of human capital (Coleman 1988). 
Therefore, strong interpersonal ties among TMT 
members may create benefits for both the firm and 
the individuals concerned. 
With respect to the firm-level benefits of interper-
sonal ties in TMTs, the strategic value of senior ex-
ecutives to their organizations results not only from 
their individual knowledge, skills, and experiences, 
but also from the effectiveness of their cooperation 
(Cao, Maruping, and Takeuchi 2006; Collins and 
Clark 2003; Fee and Hadlock 2004). For example, 
top executives can generate additional value for the 
company through good teamwork (Hayes, Oeyer, 
and Schaefer 2006). Empirical evidence shows that 
a CEO’s strategic contribution to the organization is 
determined by relationships both within and out-
side the firm e.g., with other members of the TMT 
(Geletkanycz and Hambrick 1997; Rodan and 
Galunic 2004; Smith, Collins, and Clark 2005). 
Furthermore, Hambrick (1995; 2007) regarded 
interpersonal ties as a precursor to what he called 
“behavioral integration” (a culture of shared objec-
tives and strong collaboration) in TMTs, which 
helps avert team fragmentation. Behavioral integra-
tion in TMTs can enhance firm performance 
(Lubatkin, Simsek, Ling, and Veiga 2006). 
There are also individual-level benefits to having a 
close working relationship with other TMT mem-
bers, such as an enhanced willingness to help others 
or the sharing of privileged information (Burt 1997; 
Collins and Clark 2003). Senior executives below 
CEO level should benefit from strong interpersonal 
ties to the CEO. They may receive inside infor-
mation, protection, and special treatment from this 
relationship, especially if they work for a distin-
guished CEO (Graffin, Wade, Porac, and McNamee 
2008). A CEO may groom a manager with whom 
they have a close relationship as a potential succes-
sor or provide other opportunities for career ad-
vancement (Adler and Kwon 2002). From the
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Figure 1: Career Implications of Interpersonal Ties 
 
 
perspective of agency theory (Eisenhardt 1989; 
Sappington 1991), interpersonal ties may help pre-
vent the emergence of problems such as opportunis-
tic behavior, private benefit seeking, and others 
typically found in the relationship between the CEO 
and other TMT members (Cruz, Gomez-Mejia, and 
Becerra 2010; Hermalin and Weisbach 1998). 
Likewise, strong interpersonal ties may also limit 
possible scapegoating behavior prompted by the 
CEO, as sacrificing an affiliated executive is likely to 
be perceived as an acknowledgement of the duo’s 
fault (Khanna and Poulsen 1995). Overall, strong 
interpersonal ties between the CEO and a TMT 
member indicate that an individual TMT member is 
part of the CEO’s “inner circle”, the coalition where 
the firm’s most important strategic decisions are 
made (Hambrick and Mason 1984; Mooney and 
Amason 2011). From a corporate governance per-
spective, the importance of close working relation-
ships among TMT members (and especially be-
tween the CEO and other members of a firm’s TMT) 
is further highlighted by the fact that the corporate 
governance provisions in many countries – e.g., in 
the UK (see Financial Reporting Council 2010), and 
specifically in Germany (see below) – assign collec-
tive accountability to the senior management team. 
The notion of “collective accountability” implies a 
common responsibility, since both the CEO and 
other management board members are regarded as 
agents of superordinate principals (Fama 1980). 
Despite the arguments developed above, which 
favor strong interpersonal ties between the CEO and 
other TMT members, there may also be disad-
vantages to such close relationships. Classical expo-
sitions of principal-agent relationships (see Berle 
and Means 1932) focus primarily on the impersonal 
relationship between shareholders and managers 
(rather than on proximal relationships within 
TMTs). From this perspective, close interpersonal 
ties between the CEO and other TMT members may 
facilitate collusion and weaken the mechanisms for 
mutual control among agents (Daily and Schwenk 
1996; Ocasio 1994). Interpersonal ties may also 
make managers less able or inclined to assess pro-
posals for strategic actions, investments, and the 
like from different, independent perspectives (Rank 
and Tuschke 2010; Wiersema and Bantel 1992). 
Overall, principal-agent theory takes a skeptical 
perspective on the benefits of interpersonal ties 
among managers. 
Furthermore, there may be situations in which 
strong ties to the CEO may be disadvantageous to 
individual TMT members. We expect that strong 
interpersonal ties between the CEO and other senior 
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managers can result in a linkage of disciplinary 
action against both of them (Fee and Hadlock 
2004). In the event of a dismissal or forced resigna-
tion of a CEO, executives with close relationships 
may be seen as “partners in crime”. The stronger an 
alliance between the CEO and a top executive, the 
less likely the latter will be regarded either as a 
promising CEO successor or as a reliable and trust-
worthy strategic partner for the new CEO (Cao, 
Maruping, and Takeuchi 2006; Shen and Cannella 
2002b). Furthermore, strong interpersonal ties to 
the former CEO may make it more difficult for a 
senior executive to establish good working relation-
ships with a new CEO (Kesner and Dalton 1994). 
Overall, the arguments developed so far suggest that 
in the normal course of a firm’s operations, strong 
interpersonal ties among the TMT members, in 
general, and between the CEO and other TMT 
members, in particular, should be beneficial to both 
the firm and the TMT members concerned. Howev-
er, in more critical situations – e.g., when there are 
concerns regarding the effectiveness of the top 
team’s governance, or if the CEO faces dismissal – 
strong interpersonal ties to the CEO may also have 
detrimental effects. In our work, we focus specifical-
ly on the career implications of strong interpersonal 
ties to the CEO for an individual TMT member. 
Figure 1 depicts our theoretical model and hypothe-
ses, developed below. 
2.2 Career Effects of Interpersonal Ties 
to the CEO for Individual TMT 
Members 
On the basis of the arguments so far, strong ties 
should be beneficial for individual TMT members in 
an established working relationship with the CEO, 
for several reasons: First, strong interpersonal ties 
with other colleagues, and in particular with senior 
ones, give individual managers access to inside in-
formation, allow work sharing, and ultimately raise 
individual (as well as collective) performance (Adler 
2001; Granovetter 1973; Nahapiet and Ghoshal 
1998). These factors, in turn, should result in great-
er recognition, higher compensation, and enhanced 
career prospects for the managers concerned (Adler 
and Kwon 2002). Second, CEOs are more likely to 
provide special protection and support to managers 
with whom they maintain close relationships, for 
example, in situations in which these managers face 
criticism or even the threat of dismissal (Adler 2001; 
Cao, Maruping, and Takeuchi 2006). Empirical 
research has shown that a CEO’s social capital pro-
tects him/her from dismissal to some extent 
(Wrage, Tuschke and Bresser 2011); likewise, we 
should expect that a TMT member’s social capital 
(which partially consists of strong interpersonal 
relationship with the CEO) also provides some pro-
tective power against dismissal. Third, there are 
significant emotional benefits of close relationships 
between managers, and these are particularly pro-
nounced for relationships with seniors (Collins and 
Clark 2003). Having a “special relationship” with 
the CEO can also enhance one’s status (Graffin, 
Wade, Porac, and McNamee 2008). Due to the cor-
relation between individual performance and hap-
piness (Ledford 1999), the performance-enhancing 
effects and emotional benefits of a close relationship 
with the CEO should further reinforce one another. 
For these reasons, we would expect that TMT mem-
bers who have a close relationship with the CEO are 
less likely to leave their position voluntarily – in 
search of a position in another organization – or 
involuntarily (i.e., as a result of dismissal). Although 
the enhanced performance resulting from such a 
relationship may improve their job prospects on the 
external labor market, a move would signify the 
forfeiture of at least part of the basis for that strong 
performance. Moreover, a CEO who has a strong 
relationship with an individual member of their 
management team will generally invest more to 
keep that person on the team, and lend greater pro-
tection to them in situations when other parties 
(e.g., supervisory boards) are calling for their dis-
missal. Therefore, we expect strong interpersonal 
ties to the CEO to reduce the likelihood of a TMT 
member’s turnover. In this context, the notion of 
“turnover” comprises all cases in which a TMT 
member leaves the focal organization, whether for 
voluntary (e.g., the acceptance of a position in a 
different organization) or involuntary (i.e., dismis-
sal) reasons. 
Hypothesis 1: Strong interpersonal ties to the CEO 
decrease the likelihood of turnover of a TMT mem-
ber. 
Thus far, the discussion of the value in interpersonal 
ties to the CEO relates primarily to a situation in 
which the CEO’s position in office is stable. In con-
trast, when the CEO leaves the office, the vacant 
CEO position may either be filled by an external or 
an internal successor. The latter case also opens an 
opportunity for a TMT member to rise to the top of 
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the organization. We assume that the succession 
type and context determine the requirements for the 
new CEO and, thus, influence the successor choice. 
Empirical studies have shown that CEO dismissal 
increases the likelihood that an outsider will be 
selected to succeed, whereas chances for insiders to 
succeed are higher in the case of routine CEO turno-
ver, such as retirement or voluntary departure 
(Boeker and Goodstein 1993; Cannella and Lubat-
kin 1993; Datta and Guthrie 1994). Even if they are 
not promoted to the “top job”, those seen as promis-
ing candidates for this position may ultimately ben-
efit from the CEO’s departure from the company. 
For example, a supervisory board that recognizes 
that a promising candidate has been “passed over” 
may give them an increased mandate in order to 
prevent the manager concerned from leaving their 
position voluntarily and reduce the potential nega-
tive consequences of fundamental changes in man-
agement (Barnett and Carroll 1995; Virany, Tush-
man, and Romanelli 1992). 
Overall, we expect the turnover of a CEO for routine 
reasons to enhance the chances of other TMT mem-
bers to make an upward career move. Such a career 
move may be internal (promotion to the CEO posi-
tion, or to an enhanced role), or external e.g., when 
the TMT member decides to leave the company 
after being passed over in the promotion carousel. 
Even in the latter case, a rationally acting manager 
is unlikely to settle for a lesser position, but will 
leave the company when a position at least as good 
as the current one presents itself. Therefore, we 
hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 2a:  A CEO routine turnover increases 
the likelihood that another TMT member makes an 
upward career move. 
In addition, we expect strong interpersonal ties 
between the CEO and an individual TMT member 
to further reinforce the likelihood that the latter 
makes an internal or external upward move as the 
CEO leaves office. A manager with a close relation-
ship to the departing CEO may either be considered 
a potential successor to the CEO (Hambrick, 
Geletkanycz, and Fredrickson 1993), or in case they 
are not offered the CEO role, may be promoted to 
another position internally. If the person concerned 
had any hopes for such a promotion – and strong 
interpersonal ties to the previous CEO may well lead 
an individual to consider themselves an “heir appar-
ent” – and these hopes are disappointed, that per-
son may well leave the organization voluntarily 
when the opportunity for at least an equivalent posi-
tion elsewhere presents itself (Lambert, Larcker, 
and Weigelt 1993). 
Furthermore, if the CEO makes an upward move 
(e.g., by becoming the CEO of a larger and more 
prestigious company), and they have a close rela-
tionship with a member of their previous team, they 
may try to take that manager with them to the new 
organization, which would likely imply an upward 
move for that manager, too. In contrast, a manager 
only loosely embedded into the CEO’s social net-
work may have less of an incentive to leave their 
position voluntarily. 
Casual interpersonal ties to a CEO who leaves the 
company may well enable a manager to more easily 
develop a stronger relationship with the new CEO. 
In addition, it seems less likely that a manager with 
a departing CEO will follow them to a new organiza-
tion, or be promoted directly to the CEO position. 
Therefore, we expect the strength of the interper-
sonal ties between a TMT member and a CEO who 
leaves office for routine reasons to moderate the 
effect of CEO turnover on the career prospects of the 
manager concerned. 
Hypothesis 2b:  Strong interpersonal ties between 
a TMT member and the departing CEO further 
increase the effect of CEO routine turnover on the 
likelihood of an upward move of the TMT member 
concerned, whereas weak interpersonal ties de-
crease this effect. 
We also expect that the dismissal of a CEO increases 
the likelihood of other TMT members’ dismissal.  
Dismissal can be regarded as the ultimate device to 
discipline top management; thus, it takes place pri-
marily when corporate change is required (Shen and 
Cannella 2002b). Top executives determine new 
corporate strategies and strategic change is more 
likely to be initiated by managers recruited from 
outside the organization (Westphal and Fredrickson 
2001). In this situation, principals (e.g., supervisory 
boards) may hold other TMT members co-
responsible for the CEO’s actions and perceived 
failures; including the failure to formulate and im-
plement an effective strategy. Such cases of “pun-
ishment by association” should be particularly prev-
alent in corporate governance systems such as the 
German one, which stipulates the collective ac-
countability of a management board. In line with 
this argument, Fee and Hadlock (2004) found that 
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the dismissal of top managers below CEO level is 
mainly induced by the firing of the CEO, rather than 
by poor firm performance per se. Similarly, Hayes, 
Oyer, and Schaefer (2006) in their analysis of top 
management team composition changes in cases 
where a CEO leaves, showed that CEO turnover 
significantly increases the likelihood of TMT turno-
ver. However, in light of research on the perceived 
negative consequences generally associated with a 
break in management continuity (Barnett and Car-
roll 1995, Virany, Tushman, and Romanelli 1992), 
we would expect supervisory boards to stagger their 
dismissals of multiple top managers, if at all possi-
ble. Overall, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 3a:  A CEO dismissal increases the 
likelihood that another TMT member is dismissed. 
Furthermore, the strength of the relationship be-
tween the management team and a CEO who faces 
dismissal influences the likelihood of a team mem-
ber being dismissed, too. First, supervisory boards 
may view the members of the dismissed CEO’s for-
mer social network as their “partners in crime” and 
extend the same criticism leveled against the CEO to 
these “allies” (Fee and Hadlock 2004). In contrast, 
managers with greater relational distance from the 
dismissed CEO are less likely to be associated with, 
and blamed for, their actions. Second, following a 
CEO dismissal, the successor in this position may 
want to distance themselves not only from the fired 
CEO, but also from the former CEO’s social network 
(Cao, Maruping, and Takeuchi 2006). Therefore, 
the new CEO will offer less protection to members 
of that network, or even mead out disciplinary ac-
tions to the CEO’s former associates. Alternatively, 
building constructive relationships with TMT mem-
bers – a critical success factor for incoming CEOs – 
is likely to be more difficult with managers closely 
related to the former CEO (Shen and Cannella 
2002b). If the new CEO cannot build productive 
relationships with or fails to develop trust among 
existing TMT members, they might push for their 
replacement in order to make way for executives 
with whom better cooperation and a stronger rela-
tionship can be achieved (Kesner and Dalton 1994; 
Shen and Cannella 2002b). In sum, a strong rela-
tionship with a CEO who has been fired may, subse-
quently, increase the likelihood that a senior man-
ager will be dismissed. 
Hypothesis 3b:  Strong interpersonal ties between 
a TMT member and the departing CEO further 
increase the effect of CEO dismissal on the likeli-
hood that the TMT member concerned is dismissed, 
too, whereas weak interpersonal ties decrease this 
effect. 
Overall, our theory suggests that interpersonal ties 
between a CEO and another TMT member affect the 
career prospects of the latter party. Under normal 
conditions – i.e., when there is no change in the 
CEO position – such ties will enhance the likelihood 
that the TMT member concerned stays in office. 
However, if the CEO leaves their position for routine 
reasons or as a result of disciplinary actions, a 
strong relationship with that CEO will further rein-
force the effect that this change has on the likeli-
hood that the manager concerned makes an upward 
career move, or is disciplined, too. In contrast, a 
weak relationship with the departing CEO will 
weaken these effects. In this sense, strong interper-
sonal ties to the CEO, while generally positive, may 
have an element of ambivalence for the executive 
concerned, in that they may raise the potential spill-
over effects of disciplinary actions leveled against 
the CEO. 
2.3 Whose Relationship with the CEO? 
Our argument developed above relates to the career 
implications of interpersonal ties from the perspec-
tive of an individual member of a firm’s TMT. Test-
ing this argument empirically benefits from focusing 
on senior managers in a particular functional role 
present in all firms under consideration, so as to 
hold this factor constant over the range of observa-
tions and exclude any variance associated with dif-
ferences in career prospects between different man-
agerial functions. We chose to investigate the career 
implications of CEO interpersonal ties for CFOs, for 
three interrelated reasons. 
First, we sought to focus on a functional role that is 
present at management board level in the majority 
of firms in the population under study. In our re-
search, we found that most publicly quoted compa-
nies in Germany that are contained in the leading 
stock market indices Deutscher Aktienindex (DAX) 
or Midcap-DAX (MDAX) had a CFO as a member of 
the management board, while there was substantial 
variation between firms in all other functional posi-
tions. Existing research confirms that the CFO is 
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also the predominant executive – alongside the CEO 
– in the Anglo-Saxon system of corporate govern-
ance (Nath and Mahajan 2008). 
Second, in order to play their role effectively, the 
CFO needs to have a relatively strong relationship 
with the CEO. Considerable literature attests to the 
significant increase, in recent years, in the CFO’s 
importance as “co-pilots of” or “key strategic part-
ners to” the CEO (Arthaud-Day, Certo, Dalton, and 
Dalton 2006; Collins, Masli, Reitenga, and Sanchez 
2009; Menon and Williams 2008; Mian 2001; Zorn 
2004). Both the accounting literature (Baxter and 
Chua 2008; Geiger, North, and O’Connell 2005) 
and the management literature (Logue 2010; Menz 
2012; Nicholson and Cannon 2000; Tulimieri and 
Banai 2010) attribute a central strategic role to 
CFOs, beyond their traditional, more narrowly de-
fined functional tasks. At the same time, however, 
the CFO needs to balance this need for proximity 
with the necessary independence and neutrality. 
Several corporate governance jurisdictions have put 
greater weight on the accountability of the CFO role 
in recent years. For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act, introduced in the US in 2002, attributed great-
er responsibility to the CFO (U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives 2002), while substantially strengthening 
the position (Geiger and North 2006; Rehbein 
2010). 
Third, in line with their generally increased role, 
CFOs are becoming increasingly likely to advance 
into CEO positions, rather than to stay within their 
functional role until the end of their careers (Ocasio 
and Kim 1999). For these reasons, we view the CFO 
to be a particularly suitable role in our endeavor to 
study the career implications of a TMT member‘s 
interpersonal ties to the CEO. 
2.4 The Importance of the German 
Corporate Governance Context 
Our empirical work focuses on the German corpo-
rate governance system, which is characterized by a 
dual board structure with the supervisory board 
(Aufsichtsrat) and the management board 
(Vorstand) (see, for example, Baums and Scott 
2005). This context is particularly well-suited for a 
study of the ambivalent career effects of strong in-
terpersonal ties between the CEO and other TMT 
members for at least two reasons. 
First, German corporate law mandates collective 
decision-making in the management board (§77 
Section 1 of the German Stock Corporation Act [Ak-
tiengesetz; AktG]). Thus, close cooperation in a 
well-integrated TMT is particularly important in 
this context for both economic and legal reasons. 
Second, due to the relative independence of the 
supervisory board and the explicit requirement that 
the supervisory board appoints, monitors, and – 
given sufficient cause – dismisses the CEO as well as 
other non-CEO management board members, (see 
§84 Section 3 AktG), Germany has the highest dis-
missal rate of underperforming CEOs and other top 
managers worldwide (see Lucier, Schuyt and Tse 
2005). Thus, to the extent that they do exist, one 
should be able to track career effects of CEO turno-
ver, and in particular of CEO dismissal, on other top 
executives in using a sample of German firms. 
3 Data and Methods 
3.1 Sample and Data Collection 
The key sources for our empirical data were the 
databases LexisNexis (for information on executive 
turnover), Datastream and Worldscope from 
Thomson Financial (for firm performance metrics), 
and Hoppenstedt Aktienführer (a database that 
provides detailed information on German corpora-
tions), as well as annual reports from the companies 
concerned. Our study examines all companies that 
featured their primary listing in the DAX or MDAX 
for at least a full year between January 1998 and 
December 2006. For these companies, the analysis 
included all the years (n = 916 company years) dur-
ing which the company was listed on a German 
stock exchange. 
This approach keeps the company sample relatively 
constant across the period of analysis. Changes in 
the composition of indices and the restructuring of 
the MDAX in 2003 (the number of companies it 
covers was reduced from 70 to 50) consequently 
have less impact on the analysis. We included com-
panies from the first full year in which they were 
listed until the last full year within the period of 
analysis before a merger or liquidation. 
3.2 Variables 
3.2.1 Upward move and dismissal of a TMT 
member 
We identified all members of the management 
boards at the sample companies. As discussed 
above, we analyze the career implications of 
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Table 1: Classification of CFO Turnover 
absolute relative
  Total 47 29.2 %
  Promotion to CEO within the organization 9 5.6 %
  Increased remit/more responsible role on the management 
boarda
14 8.7 %
  Transition to the supervisory boardb 4 2.5 %
  Departure to other organization for career reasons 20 12.4 %
  Total 30 18.6 %
  Differences of opinion, e.g., with CEO/supervisory board 11 6.8 %
  Explicit failure 10 6.2 %
  Early contract termination/unexpected announcement 9 5.6 %
  Total 84 52.2 %
  Turnover due to merger or acquisition 6 3.7 %
  Interim changes 2 1.2 %
  Prior vacancy in CFO position 6 3.7 %
  No relevant information on turnover available 6 3.7 %
  Separation of Finance division from CEO command 20 12.4 %
  Departure for personal reasons and motivations 15 9.3 %
  Health issues 2 1.2 %
  Planned/ordinary retirement 27 16.8 %
%
Observations
Dismissal
Type of CFO turnover
All identified changes in the leadership of the Finance division 161
Other 
turnover 
cases
Upward move
100.0
 
a This category includes assuming more responsible roles on the management board, e.g., adoption of COO role in addition to 
CFO role. 
b The results of our analysis are not materially affected by whether these four cases are counted as "upward moves" or omitted 
from the analysis. 
 
interpersonal ties between the CEO and a particular 
member of a firm’s TMT in a specific functional role, 
namely the CFO. Therefore, we first identified the 
one executive in each company whose function was 
explicitly listed as CFO in the Hoppenstedt Aktien-
führer or in a company’s annual financial statement. 
In the remaining cases, for which this procedure did 
not yield conclusive information on the functional 
responsibilities of management board members, 
clarification was based on information in LexisNex-
is, which includes newspaper articles and ad-hoc 
reports. 
We determined CFO turnover for each company by 
comparing the names of the CFO at the end of suc-
cessive years. In addition, we used newspaper arti-
cles in LexisNexis to check whether additional turn-
over occurred over the course of the year. In total, 
we found 161 cases of CFO turnover in the period of 
analysis, which extended from 1999 to 2006. We 
conducted a content analysis of newspaper articles 
published one to two years prior to and following 
each turnover event in order to determine the rea-
sons for the change. This procedure yielded about 
3,000 articles for the 161 turnover cases. Two raters, 
independently of one another, used the newspaper 
articles to classify these turnover cases as belonging 
to one of the three categories upward move, dismis-
sal, and other turnover cases. 
The raters classified a turnover case as an upward 
move if the CFO was promoted to the CEO position 
within the same organization or to another position 
clearly superior to the their previous position (e.g., 
through the extension of their role), or if the execu-
tive concerned left the firm for career reasons to 
assume a more responsible role in another organiza-
tion. As Table 1 illustrates, our sample contains 9 
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cases where the CFO was promoted to the position 
of CEO, 20 cases where the CFO left their position 
for an external career, and 14 cases where the CFO 
assumed more responsible roles on the manage-
ment board e.g., by assuming a role as Chief Operat-
ing Officer (COO) in addition to their role as CFO. 
There were also four cases where a CFO relin-
quished this role to assume a position on the super-
visory board of the company concerned, a practice 
that was still possible in the years to which our data 
refer (it is now severely constrained). 
It is debatable whether moving from a CFO role to a 
supervisory board role constitutes an “upward ca-
reer move”: On the one hand, supervisory board 
positions carry significant status gains, and are often 
considered a sign of “true seniority”. Unsurprisingly, 
the “promotion” of TMT members to the superviso-
ry board was a common practice in German DAX 
and MDAX companies before the amendment of the 
German Stock Corporate Act in 2009 (Bresser and 
Valle Thiele 2008). On the other hand, supervisory 
board positions tend to carry a lower remuneration 
than management board roles. In order to check the 
robustness of our results, we tested our hypotheses 
both with and without these four cases of CFO “up-
ward moves” to the supervisory board, and found 
that our results were not materially affected by this 
choice. 
In line with the approach by Bresser, Valle Thiele, 
Biedermann, and Lüdeke (2005), turnover cases 
were classified as dismissals if there were clear indi-
cations of differences of opinion between the man-
ager and the supervisory board or the CEO, explicit 
failings were named as reasons for the dismissal, or 
the contract was terminated unexpectedly and 
prematurely without reasonable explanation. Other 
turnover cases included those due to mergers and 
acquisitions, planned/ordinary retirement, or de-
partures for personal reasons and motivations. 
In 95% of cases, the two independent classifications 
matched, corresponding to a Cohen (1960) Kappa 
of 0.87 and a Perreault and Leigh (1989) coefficient 
of 0.96. Both coefficients are comparable with the 
values reported in similar studies on top manage-
ment turnover, and indicate high reliability of the 
turnover classification. In total, 47 cases were classi-
fied as upward moves and 30 as dismissals; these 
77 cases are the main focus of our regression analy-
sis below. Table 1 gives an overview of the results of 
the classification. 
We employed a matched-pair design as follows. For 
each company that saw an upward move or a dis-
missal in the CFO position as described above we 
assigned each year of the sample period to a refer-
ence year of a comparable control company within 
the same industry that did not have such an event. If 
several matches were available for one company 
year in which an upward move or a dismissal took 
place, we selected the one with the least difference 
in terms of total assets. The analyses presented in 
Tables 3-5 below relate to the comparison of the 77 
upward move/dismissal company-year observa-
tions and the 77 corresponding reference years for 
control companies in the year before the turnover 
(t–1). 
3.2.2 CEO routine turnover and dismissal 
We followed a similar identification and classifica-
tion procedure as described above for CEO turno-
ver. In total, we found 116 cases of CEO turnover in 
our period of analysis, from which 67 were classified 
as routine turnover and 49 as dismissal. We then 
investigated all 77 upward move and dismissal 
cases of CFOs and the 77 matching control cases for 
preceding CEO turnover. To determine preceding 
CEO turnover in the control cases, we used the up-
ward move/dismissal date of the corresponding 
case as the point of reference for the period of analy-
sis. Since we expect the supervisory board to carry 
out the dismissals with a certain time-lag, we chose 
the time frame of one year prior to the upward 
move or dismissal of the CFO and created the 
dummy variables preceding CEO routine turnover 
and preceding CEO dismissal. 
Out of the 116 cases of CEO turnover, we identified 
41 preceding CEO turnover cases. 26 cases of these 
were classified as CEO routine turnover. We gave 
the variable preceding CEO routine turnover the 
value 1 in those cases, and 0 otherwise. The remain-
ing 15 cases were classified as CEO dismissals. 
Again, we assigned the variable preceding CEO 
dismissal the value 1 in these cases and a value of 0 
otherwise. 
3.2.3 Interpersonal ties 
As discussed above, interpersonal ties between the 
CEO and other TMT members are a multidimen-
sional construct. A long duration, frequent interac-
tions, and emotional closeness contribute to strong 
interpersonal ties between actors (Collins and Clark 
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2003; Granovetter 1973). In order to account for 
this multidimensionality appropriately, we calculat-
ed five different proxies of interpersonal ties, name-
ly mutual tenure in office, mutual firm tenure, age 
difference, simultaneous entrance in office, and 
common field of study. 
Long-term cooperation indicates a higher level of 
embeddedness of individual managers in a CEO’s 
social network. We, therefore, expect that a CEO 
and a manager who have worked together within 
the same firm and within the same management 
board for a longer period of time are likely to have 
stronger interpersonal ties than a CEO and a man-
ager who have cooperated only for a shorter period 
of time (Cao, Maruping, and Takeuchi 2006; Collins 
and Clark 2003; Hayes, Oyer, and Schaefer 2006). 
Long-tenured top management teams are also 
found to be more committed to the firm, and the 
mindset of the individual team members will be 
more similar in long-tenured than short-tenured 
teams (Boeker 1997; Carpenter, Geletkanycz, and 
Sanders 2004; Finkelstein and Hambrick 1990; 
Keck 1997). Hence, we measure the duration of the 
relationship by the two variables mutual tenure in 
office and mutual firm tenure. 
We do not have appropriate data available to meas-
ure the frequency of interaction between CEOs and 
other TMT members, but we created three variables 
measuring the emotional intensity or closeness of 
this relationship. As shown in previous studies, 
CEOs tend to build interpersonal ties to TMT mem-
bers who are similar to themselves in terms of their 
age and experience (Finkelstein, Hambrick, and 
Cannella 2009; Mooney and Amason 2011). Our 
first variable, age difference, measures the absolute 
difference in age between the CFO, as the TMT 
member in focus, and the CEO. The greater this 
absolute age difference, the weaker the expected 
CEO-CFO interpersonal ties and vice versa. We 
further created the dummy variable simultaneous 
entrance in office which takes the value of 1 if both 
the CFO and the CEO started their job on the man-
agement board at the same time (within one month) 
and 0 otherwise. As a last measure for the emotional 
closeness of the relationship, we created the dummy 
variable common field of study which takes the 
value of 1 if both the CFO and the CEO had a higher 
education in a similar field (e.g., economics, engi-
neering, law) and 0 otherwise. Commonality in 
educational background has been found to be a 
significant predictor of behavioral integration in 
TMTs (Simsek, Veiga, Lubatkin, and Dino 2005). 
Finally, the measures of the five proxy variables of 
interpersonal ties were factor analyzed. They loaded 
on one factor (Eigenvalue = 1.47), which accounts 
for 29 percent of the variance. Thus, we created a 
composite measure of CEO-CFO interpersonal ties 
based on standardized factor scores, which has a 
mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. We also 
checked the robustness of our results by including in 
our regressions a measure of interpersonal ties that 
relied solely on the two variables mutual tenure in 
office and mutual firm tenure. The reason for this 
approach was that it can be argued that the other 
three variables (age difference, simultaneous en-
trance in office, and common field of study) are 
measures of homophily – “perhaps the most robust 
empirical regularity describing social relations” 
(Kleinbaum, Stuart and Tushman 2011: p. 1) – 
which may be an antecedent of the formation of a 
relationship, but not necessarily a measure of rela-
tionship quality between two TMT members. How-
ever, our two-dimensional measure involving mu-
tual tenure in office and mutual firm tenure only 
yielded largely similar results to those of the five-
dimensional measure. As the five-dimensional 
measure is richer than the two-dimensional one, we 
decided to display the results of the former. 
3.2.4 Control variables 
Principal-agent theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976) 
interprets a negative association between firm per-
formance and top executive dismissal as the result 
of a disciplinary mechanism (Denis and Denis 
1995). Empirical evidence broadly confirms this 
association regarding the position of CEO (Bresser, 
Valle Thiele, Biederman, and Lüdeke 2005; Cough-
lan and Schmidt 1985; Huson, Parrino, and Starks 
2001; Kaplan 1994; Weisbach 1988), of the CFO 
(Mian 2001), and other TMT members (Fee and 
Hadlock 2004). Therefore, we control for firm per-
formance in our analyses. 
Firm performance may be seen as a multidimen-
sional phenomenon (Shen and Cannella 2002a) for 
which multiple measures exist. In line with recent 
studies on management turnover (Bresser, Valle 
Thiele, Biederman, and Lüdeke 2005; Huson, Mala-
testa, and Parrino 2004), we use Operating Return 
on Assets (ORoA) to control for firm performance in 
our study. ORoA appears especially relevant for the 
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topic of this study as this measure reflects opera-
tional firm performance and is also fairly independ-
ent of short-term accounting policy manipulation 
(Dowdell and Krishnan 2004; Geiger and North 
2006; Geiger, North, and O’Connell 2005). We 
adjusted the measure for industry and annual ef-
fects by calculating the difference between the re-
spective performance metrics of the company and 
the industry median in the year concerned for those 
metrics based on the Industry Classification 
Benchmark (ICB) provided by Thomson Financial. 
We further control for contextual factors (Friedman 
and Singh 1989) such as firm size (calculated as the 
logarithm of total assets), firm age, CFO tenure in 
office, CFO age, and the shareholder structure, 
measured as the share of institutional investors. 
Following Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1997) and Denis 
and Serrano (1996), we also took into account the 
potential interaction effects between the share of 
institutional investors and firm performance. Fur-
thermore, we experimented with CEO and CFO 
gender as potential control variables. However, due 
to the fact that TMTs in Germany are still fairly 
male-dominated, there were very few cases of fe-
male executives in our sample, and despite includ-
ing gender-related dummy variables in our analyses, 
the results were not affected in any material way. 
3.3 Statistical Analysis 
We tested our hypotheses using hierarchical logistic 
regressions. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests showed that 
the forced and routine turnover incidences were 
normally distributed. The hierarchical logistic re-
gression analyses allowed us to enter the explanato-
ry variables in a stepwise fashion, thus determining 
their individual and joint contributions. We used 
three hierarchical logistic regression models to pre-
dict the overall likelihood of CFO upward move or 
dismissal taken together, and four hierarchical lo-
gistic regression models to predict CFO upward 
moves and CFO dismissals, respectively. In the first 
model, we entered our control variables into the 
regression equations. Afterwards, we entered our 
explanatory variables according to our hypotheses, 
and finally the interaction terms to analyze the role 
of interpersonal ties. 
When testing moderator interactions in a logistic 
regression, it is suboptimal to rely on the strength, 
significance, and direction of the interaction term 
(Hoetker 2007). The interaction coefficient depends 
on the value of the moderator variable and the val-
ues and coefficients of all other variables in the 
model. It is not a constant, which makes the analysis 
and interpretation of moderating hypotheses more 
complex (Wiersema and Bowen 2009). Therefore, 
we used a methodology recommended by Ai and 
Norton (2003) and used by Lel and Miller (2008) in 
a similar context to compute the true interaction 
effect and test its statistical significance, which is 
based on the estimated cross-partial derivative 
(Norton, Wang, and Ai 2004). 
4 Results 
Table 2 reports the means, standard deviations, and 
correlations for the dependent, independent, and 
control variables in our study. In any given year of 
our period of analysis (1999-2006; n = 916 company 
years), the likelihood of upward move for CFOs is 
higher (0.05) than the likelihood of dismissal 
(0.03). CFOs in our sample are on average 51.08 
years old and stay in office for 5.14 years. The corre-
lations show that firm performance and CFO tenure 
in office seem to negatively influence the likelihood 
of CFO dismissal (-0.31/-0.36). Moreover, we find 
high positive correlations between CEO-CFO inter-
personal ties and CFO tenure in office (0.66) as well 
as CFO age (0.46), which is not surprising, since old 
and long-tenured CFOs are expected to be deeply 
embedded into a firm’s social network. 
The correlations reported in Table 2 are of moderate 
magnitude. In order to avert any multicollinearity 
problems, we ran our regression models as ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regressions to examine the vari-
ance inflation factors (VIFs). The VIFs ranged from 
1.00 to 3.08 in the different models, which is well 
below even a stringent threshold of 4 (O'Brien 
2007). Hence, multicollinearity should not be a 
problem in our research. We tested our hypotheses 
using hierarchical logistic regression models (Tables 
3-5). When interpreting the fit statistics, note that 
McFadden’s Pseudo R² in logistic regressions is no 
direct equivalent to the R² in OLS regressions. 
McFadden’s Pseudo R² provides indications regard-
ing the power of the independent variables to suc-
cessfully discriminate between CFO upward 
move/dismissal cases and the matching control 
cases. When comparing different models on our 
data, the McFadden’s Pseudo R², which takes a val-
ue between 0 and 1, will be higher for the models 
with the greater likelihood (Hoetker 2007). 
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In order to test Hypothesis 1, we estimated three 
different regression models where we examined the 
likelihood of CFO upward move or dismissal (Table 
3). The first model (1.1) is the controls only model. 
We found a significant (p < 0.01) negative impact of 
the control variables firm performance and CFO 
tenure in office. Hence, in line with previous re-
search, poor firm performance increases the likeli-
hood of CFO turnover. Furthermore, CFOs leaving 
their position involuntarily or for upward moves do 
so after a short tenure in office. In addition, a small 
share of institutional investors appears to increase 
the likelihood of a CFO upward move or dismissal 
(p < 0.05), which stands in contrast to the findings 
by Denis and Serrano (1996) as well as Denis, Denis, 
and Sarin (1997). 
Likelihood Ratio (LR) tests showed that inclusion of 
the variable CEO-CFO interpersonal ties in model 
1.2 led to an improvement in model quality (Pseudo 
R² = 0.15; LR`2 = 30.86, p < 0.001). The coefficient 
on CEO-CFO interpersonal ties is negative and 
significant (p < 0.05), implying that a strong rela-
tionship between a TMT member and the CEO de-
creases the likelihood of turnover, which supports 
Hypothesis 1. In a next step, we included the varia-
bles preceding CEO routine turnover and preced-
ing CEO dismissal in model 1.3, which produced a 
further improvement in model quality (Pseudo R² = 
0.21; LR`2 = 43.62, p < 0.001). The coefficients on 
preceding CEO routine turnover and preceding 
CEO dismissal were positive and significant (p < 
0.01 respectively p < 0.05). 
In order to test Hypotheses 2a and 2b, we estimated 
logistic regression models 2.1-2.4 (Table 4), where 
we examined the relationship between CEO routine 
turnover and subsequent CFO upward move. In a 
first model (2.1), we introduced the control varia-
bles. As expected, the explanatory power of this 
model is limited. Just as before, we found a signifi-
cant (p < 0.01) negative impact of the control varia-
ble CFO tenure in office. Hence, CFOs leaving their 
position for upward moves do so after a short tenure 
in office. 
In a second step, we included the variable CEO-CFO 
interpersonal ties in model 2.2, which led to a sig-
nificant improvement in model quality (Pseudo R² = 
0.23; LR`2 = 29.14, p < 0.001). Including the varia-
bles preceding CEO routine turnover and preced-
ing CEO dismissal in model 2.3 led to a further 
improvement in model quality (Pseudo R² = 0.30; 
LR`2 = 38.44, p < 0.001). The coefficient on preced-
ing CEO dismissal was positive, but not significant, 
and the coefficient on preceding CEO routine turn-
over was positive and significant (p < 0.01). This 
result supports Hypothesis 2a. 
In the final model 2.4, we introduced the interaction 
term preceding CEO routine turnover × CEO-CFO 
interpersonal ties. Again, the overall model quality 
improved (Pseudo R² = 0.31; LR`2 = 39.32, p < 
0.001), providing confirmatory evidence that the 
interaction between interpersonal ties and CEO 
routine turnover supports explanations of CFO up-
ward moves. 
However, in logistic regressions the coefficients and 
their associated significance levels of multiplicative 
interaction terms are unreliable guides for the true 
interaction effects (Hoetker 2007). Therefore, we 
calculated the true interaction effect and its z-
statistics, based on the estimated cross-partial de-
rivative (Ai and Norton 2003). For another example 
of the application of this method see Lel and Miller 
(2008). 
Figure 2 shows the results. We find that the true 
interaction effect has a mean of 0.22 and is positive 
throughout (i.e., there is not a single observation for 
which it is negative), although it varies widely. For 
CFOs whose predicted probability of upward move 
is between 0.3 and 0.7, the interaction effect be-
tween preceding CEO routine turnover and CEO-
CFO interpersonal ties is highest, whereas it is low 
for CFOs with either a high (> 0.8) or a low  
(< 0.2) predicted probability of upward move. We 
only find statistically significant (p < 0.05) interac-
tion effects for a few cases where CFOs have a pre-
dicted probability of making an upward move great-
er than 0.1 (Norton, Wang, and Ai 2004). This re-
sult provides tentative evidence supporting Hypoth-
esis 2b. In order to check the robustness of our re-
sults, we also tested our hypotheses without the four 
cases of a promotion to the supervisory board. The 
results are comparable to the ones we report above, 
and we also detect comparable interaction effects. 
In order to test Hypotheses 3a and 3b, we estimated 
regression models 3.1-3.4 (Table 5), where we ex-
amined the relationship between CEO dismissal 
and subsequent CFO dismissal. As for the case of 
CFO upward move, we first introduced the control 
variables in model 3.1. The explanatory power is 
limited, as expected, and we only found a negative 
and significant (p < 0.05) impact of the variable
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firm performance, implying that poor firm perfor-
mance increases the likelihood that the CFO is fired 
(see also Mian 2001). In model 3.2, we included the 
variable CEO-CFO interpersonal ties, which led to a 
significant improvement in model quality (Pseudo 
R² = 0.34; LR`2 = 25.16; p < 0.01). Including the 
variables preceding CEO routine turnover and pre-
ceding CEO dismissal in model 3.3 further im-
proved the overall model quality (Pseudo R² = 0.44; 
LR`2 = 32.70; p < 0.001). The coefficient on preced-
ing CEO dismissal was positive and significant (p < 
0.05), which supports Hypothesis 3a that a CEO 
dismissal increases the likelihood of CFO dismissal. 
This effect holds even if firm performance is good, a 
situation in which the CFO might have hopes of 
being promoted to the CEO position. 
In the final model 3.4, we introduced the interaction 
term preceding CEO dismissal × CEO-CFO inter-
personal ties, in order to test Hypothesis 3b. Again, 
the model quality improved quite considerably as a 
result of including this moderating variable (Pseudo 
R² = 0.54; LR`2 = 40.13, p < 0.001). Therefore, our 
results also provide confirmatory evidence for Hy-
pothesis 3b. 
Figure 3 illustrates the true interaction effect and its 
z-statistics. Similar to the case of CFO upward 
move, we also find for CFO dismissal that the true 
interaction effect is positive (mean = 0.92) across 
the entire range of observations, and varies widely. 
It also depends on other covariates. For CFOs whose 
predicted probability of being dismissed is between 
0.3 and 0.7, the interaction effect between preced-
ing CEO dismissal and CEO-CFO interpersonal ties 
is highest, whereas it is low for CFOs with either a 
high (> 0.8) or low (< 0.2) predicted probability of 
being dismissed. Nevertheless, we only find statisti-
cally significant (p < 0.05) interaction effects for a 
few cases where CFOs have a predicted probability 
of being dismissed between 0.3 and 0.6 (Norton, 
Wang, and Ai 2004). This result supports Hypothe-
sis 3b. However, it also shows that interpersonal ties 
do not necessarily moderate the relationship be-
tween CEO and CFO turnover. 
A comparison of Figures 2 and 3 also suggests that 
the interaction effect of CEO-CFO interpersonal ties 
is higher in case both executives are dismissed (Fig-
ure 3) than in case they leave on a routine basis 
(Figure 2), but we find a greater number of statisti-
cally significant incidences for the latter case. 
5 Discussion and Conclusion 
5.1 Summary and Discussion 
In this paper, we have investigated the implications 
of interpersonal ties to the CEO for the career pro-
spects of top managers. Drawing on the literature on 
the importance of social networks, in particular in 
TMTs (Cao, Maruping, and Takeuchi 2006; Collins 
and Clark 2003; Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998; Rank 
and Tuschke 2010), we argued that under normal 
conditions, managers glean special protection and 
other benefits from a strong relationship with the 
CEO of their firm. Therefore, strong interpersonal 
ties increase the likelihood that individual TMT 
members stay in office. If the CEO vacates their 
position for routine reasons, we expect this depar-
ture to have positive career implications for the 
TMT member. A strong relationship with the de-
parting CEO should further reinforce this effect. 
However, if the CEO is dismissed from office, a 
strong relationship between a top manager and that 
CEO should also increase the negative spillover 
effect of the CEO’s dismissal on the career prospects 
of the manager concerned, e.g., by raising the risk 
that the manager is fired, too. 
We investigate the career implications of interper-
sonal ties to the CEO from the perspective of a top 
manager whose specific role exists in the vast ma-
jority of large-scale companies – more often so than 
any other senior executive role –, namely the CFO. 
The fact that the CFO, as the “chief strategic part-
ner” of the CEO (Arthaud-Day, Certo, Dalton, and 
Dalton 2006; Zorn 2004), has to balance the desir-
ability of a close relationship with the CEO and the 
need to keep some professional distance from them 
for the sake of a more independent judgment (Daily 
and Schwenk 1996), is a further reason why the CFO 
position constitutes a particularly interesting con-
text for our analysis. 
To test our hypotheses, we used a sample of 77 CFO 
turnover events – cases in which the respective 
manager either made an upward move, or was dis-
missed – in large-scale, publicly quoted companies 
in Germany from 1999 to 2006. Employing a 
matched-pair design, we compare these cases with a 
corresponding set of 77 control company-year ob-
servations in which no turnover event took place. 
Our measure of interpersonal ties to the CEO is of a 
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Figure 2: Interaction Effect in the Case of CFO Upward Move 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The graphical illustration shows the magnitude of the interaction coefficient across the range of predicted probabilities of CFO 
upward move and corresponding z-values. Interaction coefficients with a z-value above and below the plotted threshold (± 1.96) are 
significant at p<.05. 
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Figure 3: Interaction Effect in the Case of CFO Dismissal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The graphical illustration shows the magnitude of the interaction coefficient across the range of predicted probabilities of CFO 
dismissal and corresponding z-values. Interaction coefficients with a z-value above and below the plotted threshold (± 1.96) are signifi-
cant at p<.05. 
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multidimensional nature, taking into account mu-
tual tenure in office, mutual firm tenure, age differ-
ence, simultaneous entrance in office, and common 
field of study. Factor analysis showed that these five 
proxies loaded on one factor. 
Our regression analyses provide support for Hy-
pothesis 1 that strong interpersonal ties to the CEO 
decrease the likelihood of turnover for the TMT 
member concerned (in our analysis, the CFO) sig-
nificantly. Therefore, our analysis indicates that, 
under normal conditions, interpersonal ties to the 
CEO are a source of stability that helps keep a man-
ager in their position. However, if a CEO leaves 
office for routine reasons, this event increases the 
likelihood that the manager concerned makes an 
upward career move, thus confirming Hypothesis 
2a. 
In order to examine whether strong interpersonal 
ties reinforce this effect, we employed the graphical 
analysis proposed by Ai and Norton (2003) and 
Norton, Wang, and Ai (2004) to illustrate the true 
interaction effect, as in logistic regression conven-
tional multiplicative terms are an unreliable indica-
tor for such interaction effects (Hoetker 2007). This 
analysis provides tentative evidence in support of 
our Hypothesis 2b that strong interpersonal ties to 
the CEO increase the effect of the CEO’s routine 
departure on the likelihood that the manager con-
cerned makes an upward career move. However, if 
the CEO is dismissed from office, the career pro-
spects of the manager concerned are impaired and 
the likelihood that they are also dismissed, in-
creased (Hypothesis 3a). Again, our analysis of the 
true interaction effect provides tentative evidence in 
support of Hypothesis 3b that a strong relationship 
with the CEO further reinforces this negative spillo-
ver effect. In order to establish whether a dismissal 
of a TMT member had a detrimental effect on the 
career prospects of that manager in the longer run, 
we analyzed whether the 30 dismissed CFOs in our 
sample obtained at least an equivalent position to 
the one from which they had been dismissed within 
one year after the dismissal event. This was the case 
for only two CFOs, whereas the career progressions 
of the remaining 28 were negatively affected on a 
long-term basis (see also Fee and Hadlock 2004; 
Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino 2004). Therefore, if 
a strong relationship with a dismissed CEO increas-
es a manager’s risk of being dismissed, too, the neg-
ative career implications for the manager concerned 
appear substantial. 
Overall, our findings add to the literature on social 
relationships in TMTs (Adler and Kwon 2002; Cao, 
Maruping, and Takeuchi 2006; Menz 2012) by re-
vealing, for the first time, the career implications of 
interpersonal ties between a manager and the CEO. 
According to our analysis, such ties reinforce the 
effects of continuity or change in the CEO position 
on whether the manager concerned stays in office, 
makes an upward move, or is fired. Likewise, weak 
interpersonal ties may reduce the effects of what 
happens to the CEO, on the manager concerned. For 
example, if the CEO is dismissed, a weak relation-
ship with that CEO may lower the risk that the 
manager is implicated in the CEO’s perceived fail-
ure, and that they share the CEO’s fate of dismissal. 
Viewed in this light, a strong relationship with the 
CEO can be a liability as well as an advantage for a 
top manager. While they may constitute an im-
portant source of team-specific human capital (Ad-
ler 2001; Adler and Kwon 2002), they may also 
increase the chances of the manager’s own dismissal 
when the CEO is fired, for whichever reason. 
Our findings indicate that interpersonal ties be-
tween top managers matter for decisions of govern-
ance bodies as to whether or not to take disciplinary 
actions. The dismissal of the CEO appears to have 
detrimental consequences for the continuance in 
office of an incumbent manager, especially if he or 
she has held strong relationships with the dismissed 
CEO. The supervisory board or the new CEO suc-
cessor themselves cannot assume that the manager, 
if they stay in office, will be able to build sufficient 
trust and working relationships with the new CEO, 
as they are seen as the dismissed CEO’s “partner in 
crime” (Shen and Cannella 2002b; Virany, Tush-
man, and Romanelli 1992). 
Moreover, we find that CEO routine turnover in-
creases the likelihood that another member of the 
TMT is internally promoted or makes an advanta-
geous career move externally. The fact that a CEO 
leaves the company voluntarily opens up opportuni-
ties within or outside the firm for a manager, mean-
ing that they can be promoted to the CEO position, 
or that they may follow the leaving CEO to a new 
organization. Furthermore, if not promoted to the 
CEO position, it seems advantageous for the man-
ager concerned to leave the organization voluntarily, 
especially if they worked together with the departed 
CEO for a longer period of time and was part of 
their social network (Cao, Maruping, and Takeuchi 
2006). The new CEO may have an incentive to re-
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place the incumbent TMT member by someone they 
have already built a strong relationship with. The 
observed moderating effect of interpersonal ties is 
higher in cases where both executives are dismissed 
than in cases where they leave on a routine basis. 
Our findings are broadly in line with agency-
theoretic approaches to the cascading set of princi-
pal-agent relationships in organizations. Classical 
agency perspectives focus on the relationship be-
tween managers (as agents) and “distant” share-
holders (as principals) (Berle and Means 1932; Ei-
senhardt 1989; Sappington 1991). From the per-
spective of the latter group, close ties among the 
members of the former provide opportunities for 
collusive behavior and make it harder to monitor 
managers on an individual basis (Daily and 
Schwenk 1996; Ocasio 1994). Therefore, such inter-
personal ties create linkages between the career 
moves of the managers concerned, be they positive 
(as in the case of upward career moves), or negative 
(as in the case of joint dismissal). 
In contrast to much of the literature on social net-
works in TMTs, our research emphasizes the indi-
vidual-level (rather than the organization- or the 
team-level) effects of interpersonal ties between 
managers, specifically, the career implications of 
such ties. Clearly, there are many team-level bene-
fits of interpersonal ties, too; for example, such ties 
are an important antecedent to the behavioral inte-
gration of TMT (Hambrick 1995, 2007), which, in 
turn, raises firm performance (Lubatkin, Simsek, 
Ling, and Veiga 2006). However, a well-integrated 
team is also more likely to be held collectively ac-
countable for its actions, in particular in a corporate 
governance context such as Germany’s which places 
significant emphasis on the principle of collective 
responsibility (§77 Section 1 AktG). 
From the perspective of an individual manager, 
interpersonal ties create spillover effects that may be 
positive as well as negative: They can help advance 
one’s career, but they can also be detrimental to it. 
Furthermore, although interpersonal ties involve 
primarily the two parties involved in a relationship, 
our findings suggest that third parties – such as 
supervisory boards – may play a role in them, too, 
namely through their perception of that tie. Simply 
speaking, a manager who has a strong relationship 
with an even more powerful figure such as the CEO 
is seen differently than one with just a weak rela-
tionship. In social psychology, the phenomenon that 
people tend to make inferences about a person on 
the basis of their relationships with others is well 
established (Casciaro 1998; Gage and Cronbach 
1955). In this study, we provide indications that 
similar mechanisms may be at work in a manage-
ment context, too. 
Our study has several limitations that need discuss-
ing. First, as is the case in other studies (e.g., Fee 
and Hadlock 2004; Mian 2001), the size of our 
sample was moderate. However, it has to be taken 
into consideration that the population into which 
our study generalizes – large, publicly quoted com-
panies in a homogeneous governance context (in 
this case, Germany) – is also fairly limited. Further 
work should aim at testing the importance of inter-
personal ties between top managers across different 
governance contexts. 
Second, classifying turnover events and distinguish-
ing between different turnover types turned out to 
be a complex task. We sought to address this chal-
lenge by gathering extensive information on execu-
tive turnover which was evaluated by two raters 
working independently. We did not consider it ap-
propriate to include smaller companies or to extend 
the period of analysis in order to include additional 
turnover events before 1999 because doing so would 
have led to distortions in the comparability of the 
companies within the sample. 
Third, in line with other studies (e.g., Cao, 
Maruping, and Takeuchi 2006; Granovetter 1973), 
we used a composite indicator to measure the 
strength of the interpersonal ties between the CEO 
and the CFO. We tried to account for the multidi-
mensionality of interpersonal ties by calculating five 
different proxy measures and factor analyzing them. 
Our results did not change materially when we left 
aside three variables that can be interpreted as 
measures of homophily (age difference, simultane-
ous entrance in office, and common field of study) 
in order to concentrate exclusively on factors that 
are clearly unrelated to homophily, namely mutual 
tenure in office and mutual firm tenure. From our 
point of view, future work should seek to find even 
richer, potentially qualitative, measures of interper-
sonal ties than we were able to employ here. In par-
ticular, it would be important to include a measure 
of interaction frequency / intensity in such a meas-
ure of interpersonal ties, which we were able to 
approximate only, but not to measure directly. Fur-
ther work on developing rich, multifaceted 
measures of interpersonal ties is urgently needed. 
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5.2 Implications for Managerial Practice 
Our study underlines the importance of TMT inter-
personal ties in contemporary corporate manage-
ment. The findings add to the results of previous 
studies confirming that top executives do not work 
in isolation (Hayes, Oyer, and Schaefer 2006). Alt-
hough interpersonal ties relate primarily to the two 
parties involved in a relationship, our findings sug-
gest that third parties – such as supervisory boards 
(or boards of directors, in the Anglo-Saxon context) 
– may play a role in them, too. Top executives with 
strong interpersonal ties to a CEO leaving for rou-
tine reasons may be perceived as a potential succes-
sor to that CEO. In contrast, top executives with 
strong interpersonal ties to a dismissed CEO may be 
perceived as their “partners in crime”, which in-
creases their likelihood of dismissal, too. Towards 
that end, it seems important for supervisory boards 
to take the team relationship with the CEO into 
account, but not to misjudge individual TMT mem-
bers’ performance by focusing solely on their inter-
personal ties to the CEO. 
From the perspective of individual managers, our 
research has shown how important the personal 
support of the CEO is. Strong interpersonal ties to 
the CEO are a source of stability, thus raising the 
likelihood that a manager stays in office. In situa-
tions where the CEO leaves office for routine rea-
sons, strong ties with the CEO enhance the possibili-
ties for the manager to make an upward move. 
However, the dismissal of the CEO can jeopardize a 
manager’s professional advancement, including 
their chances of taking over the CEO position. In 
such a case, or if personal differences with an exist-
ing or newly appointed CEO surface or are in the 
offing, voluntary departure to a position outside the 
company appears an alternative worth considering 
for a manager’s further professional development. 
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